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THE MORAL FAILURE OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER TEST
David R. Dow*
The clear and present danger test has been used for almost a century to
determine the speech the government may restrain. This test assumes that at
some point speech transforms into an act and at that moment the speech
becomes punishable. Under the clear and present danger test, the First
Amendment does not protect speech that is an incitement to imminent law-
less action.
Professor Dow suggests that the clear and present danger test protects
too little speech. He posits that speech should be protected unless the fol-
lowing three conditions are met: (1) the speaker's specific intent in uttering
the words was to cause an unlawful injury, (2) the injury in fact occurred as
a proximate result of the speech, and (3) the speaker, through his or her
speech, overwhelmed the will of the listener. Professor Dow's proposed test
is based upon the belief that the listener has a will of his or her own and
thus may choose whether to act on the words he or she heard. This test
springs from the understanding that the Free Speech Clause recognizes that
evil words do not always lead to evil acts. The proposed test would allow
the punishment only of the most culpable speakers, those who overwhelm
the will of the listener and in essence force the listener to act as the speaker
desires.
In the practice of the use of language.., one party calls out
the words, the other acts on them.'
A nineteen-year-old teenager speeding down a Texas highway south of
Houston did not hear the pursuing highway patrolman's siren because the
CD player in the stolen truck he was driving was blaring the rap lyrics of
Tupac Shakur.2 Eventually the teenager, a young man named Ronald
. Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I have profited by com-
ments on earlier drafts from Peter Linzer, Irene Rosenberg, and Suzanna Sherry. I thank
Scott Shieldes for superb research assistance, and Harriet Richman and her staff for the
same. This work was supported by a grant from the University of Houston Law Foun-
dation, for which I am grateful.
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 7, at 5e (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed., Basil Blackwell 1968) (1953).
2 The late Shakur produced so-called gangster rap music. The song the teenager
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Howard, noticed the patrolman's flashing lights in his rearview mirror, so he
pulled to the side of the road. As Officer Bill Davidson walked up to
Howard's window, the teenager pointed his semiautomatic handgun and
fired. Trooper Davidson died on the side of the highway. The State of Texas
prosecuted Howard for capital murder. At his trial, Howard raised a defense
of diminished capacity, arguing, in essence, that the violent Shakur lyrics
were in part responsible for causing him to act as he did and that the jury
should therefore mitigate his punishment accordingly. The jury sentenced
Howard to death.3
Howard's defense-his claim that the music made him do it-offends
modern notions of free will and responsibility, and the jury sensibly rejected
it. At the same time, this defense illuminates the central defect of the clear
and present danger test. This test, which is central to interpreting the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, rests on the morally unacceptable
proposition that words alone can overcome human will. The test ignores the
morally salient distinction between speech and action, between saying and
doing. Consequently, the same sentiment that moved jurors to reject
Howard's mitigation defense should compel constitutional theorists to jetti-
son the clear and present danger test.
1.0. INTRODUCTION
Without the freedom to speak, all our other freedoms are empty promis-
es.' In the history of American law, many jurists have recognized that the
First Amendment is our most precious freedom,5 yet few have been willing
was listening to was "Crooked Ass Nigga." It includes the following lyrics: "Suddenly I
see / some niggas that I don't like. / [Gunfire] / Got 'em." 2PAC, Crooked Ass Nigga,
on 2PACALYPSE NOW (Interscope Records/Atlantic 1991).
See Michelle Munn, The Effects of Free Speech, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 433, 476-79
(1994) (describing the trial of Ronald Howard). In addition to the criminal trial, Officer
Davidson's family filed suit in a Texas district court seeking damages from Shakur,
Atlantic Records, and Time Warner, Inc., claiming a causal connection between the
music and Howard's actions. See Mike Quinlan & Jim Persels, It's Not My Fault, The
Devil Made Me Do It: Attempting To Impose Tort Liability on Publishers, Producers,
and Artists for Injuries Allegedly "Inspired" by Media Speech, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417,
418-19 (1994).
" See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I
have always believed that the First Amendment is the keystone of our Government, that
the freedoms it guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction of all free-
dom.").
' See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment provides the only kind of security
system that can preserve a free government .... "); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 590 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (calling free speech "the glory of our system of government"); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (remarking that "one may say that
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to admit that the jurisprudential core of the current Free Speech Clause
doctrine is an embarrassment because it is philosophically untenable.6 The
clear and present danger test (periodically referred to in this Essay as the
"CPD test") has been used for three-quarters of a century, in one form or
another, to determine which utterances the government legitimately may
restrain. This test, however, is inimical to our core values. Although it is
thought to be expansive, it in fact protects too little speech. I argue in this
Essay that the CPD test ought to be abandoned and replaced with a nearly
categorical prohibition against the impairment of speech. The Free Speech
Clause should protect all speech unless three conditions are satisfied: (1) the
speaker's specific intent in uttering the speech was to cause an unlawful
injury, (2) the injury in fact occurred as a proximate result of the speech,
and (3) the speaker, through his or her speech, overwhelmed (i.e., con-
trolled) the will of the listener.
This test would permit the punishment of almost no speech whatsoever.
It is superior to the CPD test primarily because it adheres to the distinction
between speech and action, a distinction embraced by the First Amendment.
The Free Speech Clause recognizes that evil words do not lead inexorably
to evil acts, yet the clear and present danger test is oblivious to this crucial
recognition. The CPD test, therefore, cannot coexist with the modern notions
of individual responsibility that underlie our laws and our form of govern-
ment. The same rationale that permits the CPD test to silence speech per-
mits criminal defendants like Ronald Howard compellingly to attribute their
murderous acts to someone else's speech. Its pedigree notwithstanding, the
-clear and present danger test is terribly flawed.
[the freedom of speech] is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom"); OWEN M. FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 9 (1996) ("Freedom of speech is one of the most
remarkable aspects of American constitutional law.").
6 But see Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the
Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Particularly
Urgent for the Supreme Court To Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of
Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amend-
ment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1996). Professor Freedman characterizes current free
speech law as follows:
Current free speech law resembles the Ptolemaic system of astronomy in its last
days. Just as that theory grew increasingly incoherent in an attempt to incorporate
new empirical observations that were inconsistent with its basic postulates, so is
First Amendment doctrine disintegrating as cases reviewing restraints on speech
strive to paper over the fact that analyses based on presuppositions as to the value
of particular kinds of expression are inconsistent with the premises of the First
Amendment itself.
Id. at 885.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
2.0. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
Justice Holmes invented the clear and present danger test as a tool for
determining which speech the government could punish. As originally for-
mulated, it provided that:
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree.7
To illustrate the kind of speech that would constitute a clear and present
danger, Holmes created the well-known metaphor of someone's falsely
shouting fire in a theatre, thereby causing a panic.' Although the theatre
metaphor is the best-known illustration of Holmes's point, his opinion actu-
ally included a more interesting scenario.
Holmes assumed at the outset of his analysis that there comes a moment
when speech becomes an act. At that moment, the act of speaking is pun-
ishable. To illustrate this moment, he cited Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.9 In Gompers, a court enjoined the defendant, a labor union, from
publishing certain derogatory statements about Bucks Stove & Range Com-
pany (including, for example, statements that the company had appeared on
the American Federation of Labor's "Unfair" or "We don't patronize"
lists). ° The Supreme Court reversed the criminal contempt convictions,"
but it also noted that an injunction may at times be warranted to prevent
certain speech that, because of the prevailing circumstances, constitutes an
act.'2 Justice Lamar, writing for the Court in Gompers, reasoned that the
power of labor unions may become so vast as to render an individual help-
less by forcing that individual either to submit to the will of the union or to
seek an equitable remedy. 3 Consequently, when unions speak against an
individual (for instance, by declaring that the individual is "unfair"), and the
individual has no means of seeking peace but through submission or equita-
' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
s See id.
tO221 U.S. 418 (1911).
'0 See id. at 436.
1 See id. at 452.
12 See id. at 439; see also Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (stating that under the authority
of Gompers, the First Amendment "does not even protect a man from an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force").
13 See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 493.
736 [Vol. 6:3
1998] THE MORAL FAILURE OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
ble remedy, then the force of the speech may be so great as to constitute a
"verbal act."' 4
By relying on Gompers, Holmes accepted the proposition that saying
can be tantamount to doing. In Gompers, however, the Court seemed to
limit this proposition to cases in which speech truly overbears the listener's
will. Holmes, however, accepted the proposition without this limitation.
From the beginning, therefore, the clear and present danger test contained at
its core twin defects: It treated some speech as action, and thereby allowed
some actors to attribute the blame for their actions to someone else's
speech.
The linguistic formulation of Holmes's test has changed from time to
time, but no forthright assault has ever attacked the test's central premise
that certain speech can become action. Even Judge Learned Hand, who is
viewed as Holmes's partner in the development of the CPD test, 5 assumed
when the Second Circuit decided the case of United States v. Dennis,6 that
it was obvious that the First Amendment did not protect the leader of a mob
who gave the word "go" to a group of individuals already ripe to begin
rioting. 7 Hand did not say why this was obvious; he simply assumed that
the only difficult question arises when "persuasion and instigation [are]
inseparably confused."' 8
Whereas Holmes embedded the idea that speech, at a certain moment,
can become an act and thereby be punished as action, Hand attempted to
isolate that moment. The transformation from speech to action occurs, in
Hand's view, at the moment of "incitement" or "instigation."' 9 Justice
See id.
" Professor Gunther's recent magisterial biography of Learned Hand expresses a
preference for Hand's version of the test. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND 156-60 (1994) (recalling Holmes's focus on a causal connection between speech
and action). In contrast, Professor Bernard Schwartz has argued that Gunther exaggerat-
ed Hand's goodness and understated the virtues of Holmes's approach. See Bernard
Schwartz, Holmes versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger of Advocacy of Unlawful
Action, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 209.
' United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), afftd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
'7 See id. at 207.
1 Id. at 212. To deal with this problem of the "inseparable" confusion of persuasion
and instigation, Hand introduced his own formulation of the clear and present danger
test: "In each case," Judge Hand said, we "must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger." Id. The test bears an obvious relationship to Hand's test in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). On the basis of Hand's
formulation, the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, and on review, the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson, not only affirmed the
Second Circuit's judgment but also adopted Judge Hand's formulation of the legal rule.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
"9 See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 208.
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Harlan, however, was not satisfied with this model. Writing in Yates v.
United States, Harlan tried to cling to the dichotomy between speech and
action." In Harlan's view, Dennis concerned itself with a conspiracy to
advocate in the present the future forcible overthrow of the government,
rather than a conspiracy to advocate in the future the future forcible over-
throw of the government." In the former conspiracy, only action is sus-
pended, whereas in the latter conspiracy, the advocacy and the action are
suspended. The essential (and highly subtle) difference for Harlan lay be-
tween advocacy to do something and advocacy to believe in something.22
Whatever its merits, Harlan's attempt to establish a subtle difference
between advocacy to do and advocacy to believe was short-lived. In
Brandenburg v. Ohio,3 the Court declared an Ohio criminal syndicalism
statute unconstitutional, and in so doing established the modern incitement
formulation of the clear and present danger test. Under this test, the First
Amendment does not protect incitement to imminent lawless action.24 In
the language of the Court's per curiam opinion,
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.'
If decisions can have intentions, Brandenburg's were surely good. It is
equally clear, however, that Brandenburg perpetuated the clear and present
danger test's central proposition that some speech can be treated, and there-
by punished, as action. 6 This proposition, the core of the CPD test, is
20 See 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
21 See id. at 324.
2 See id. at 324-25.
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
The appellant in Brandenburg, the leader of a local Ohio Ku Klux Klan chapter,
invited a television reporter to attend a Klan rally. A film of the rally taken by the
reporter, which later aired on television, showed hooded figures setting fire to a cross
and shouting slogans such as "Save America," "Send the Jews back to Israel," and
"Bury the niggers." Id. at 446 n.1. The film also depicted a speech in which the appel-
lant stated, "We're not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Con-
gress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible
that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." Id. at 446.
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
26 The Court has been unclear as to what exactly constitutes an imminent threat of
harm. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). In Hess, the Court reversed a disorderly
conduct conviction. The defendant was arrested at a demonstration when he yelled out,
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problematic for two reasons. The first reason is historical. The speech that is
deemed to be action, and therefore subject to suppression and sanction under
this test, is never really dangerous at all; the state simply believes it to be.
Justice Douglas put it best in his dissent in Dennis:
Communists in this country have never made a respectable
or. serious showing in any election. I would doubt that there
is a village, let alone a city or county or state, which the
Communists could carry. Communism in the world scene is
no bogeyman; but Communism as a political faction or party
in this country plainly is.27
The second reason is philosophical. The consequence of collapsing the dis-
tinction between speech and action is to deny the potency of the human
will, yet modern notions of moral and criminal responsibility, including
those that underlie the Constitution itself, depend intimately on the power of
the human will. The CPD test is at war with these notions. The following
section focuses on this second defect.'
"We'll take the fucking street later," as the local police were clearing the streets of
demonstrators. 414 U.S. at 107. The Court noted, "At best ... the statement could be
taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time." Id. at 108. Similarly, in
Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court reasoned that when a few weeks separated poten-
tially incendiary speeches from the violent reactions of the listeners, the speech did not
present an actionable threat. See 458 U.S. at 928.
In fact, Brandenburg often has been used as a tool of dissent. See Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 773 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (upholding the plenary
power of the Attorney General to deny a waiver of a statutory exclusion of an alien-in
this case a Belgian journalist and Marxist theoretician-who advocated or published
Communist doctrine); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 863 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Court's departure from the CPD test is a means of prohi-
bition); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 716-17 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(stating that political ideologies as well as other forms of more traditional artistic ex-
pression are protected by the free speech doctrine); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109,
131 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The only way to stop murders and drug abuse is
to punish them directly."); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 688-89 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that advocacy of "overthrow" or "basic fundamental changes in
government" is protected by the First Amendment).
27 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 588 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The argument that the test is rooted in unfounded fear of German militarism and
Soviet Communism is addressed in David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the
Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 1998).
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3.0. THE MORAL FAILURE OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of
some, if others are left free to demonstrate their errors and especially
when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced
by the false reasonings; these are safer corrections than the con-
science of the judge.29
We should start with the words of the text: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... .,0 The clear and present
danger test obviously does not adhere to this language. To the contrary, the
test assumes that certain speech may be punished because that speech will
undermine democracy. It is therefore akin to the argument that holds that
the Constitution may be violated when the cost of adhering to it would be
destruction of the Constitution itself, for the Constitution is not a suicide
pact.3 This argument is a sham, however. The simple truth of the matter is
that there has never in the history of the modern state been a democracy that
collapsed due to the presence of too much speech. Indeed, since the Enlight-
enment, the only states that have systematically suppressed speech have
been states that feared democracy, not states where democracy has
thrived.32
History (and a profound overreaction to Communism) perhaps can ex-
plain the CPD test, but history cannot justify it. The Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment embodies the intuitive proposition that there is a dis-
tinction among thinking something, saying something, and doing something.
Although action at times can qualify as speech,33 and although speech is, in
a sense, an action,' a strong moral intuition holds that saying something is
different from doing something. The Free Speech Clause embraces this intu-
ition. Saying that someone ought to be shot is different from shooting some-
one; saying that banks should be robbed and the money redistributed to the
poor is different from robbing a bank. Even instructing a soldier to execute
an innocent civilian is different from executing the civilian; the shooter
cannot escape blame by attributing responsibility for his act to the speaker.
29 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson).
3o U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1962).
32 put to the side the controversial question of what constitutes a democracy. See
generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MA'FrER OF PRINCIPLE 59-60 (1985) (discussing a pro-
cess-based theory of decision making to arrive at a conception of democracy).
" As a doctrinal proposition, this assertion is commonly associated with cases like
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (treating the burning of a draft card as
speech).
" Muscular contractions produce the noise that is speech.
[Vol. 6:3740
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The plain language of the Free Speech Clause distinguishes between actors
and speakers and attributes responsibility for events solely to actors, not to
speakers. The CPD test, ignoring the text of the First Amendment, ignores
too this moral intuition.
It is far too late in the jurisprudential day to deny that laws can be prop-
erly enacted yet still be immoral, or.that wars can be properly declared yet
still be unjust. Any theory of the Free Speech Clause that restricts the liber-
ty of individuals to insist that certain laws are unethical or that certain wars
are unjust is fatally flawed. No theory, however, is capable of treating some
speech as action, thereby making it punishable, without flowing ineluctably
into this fatal flaw. Put differently, all efforts that have aspired to preserve
both the freedom of individuals to criticize as well as the power of the state
to punish have failed, and the reasons they have failed are clear. First, they
attempt to make use of the elusive distinction between advocacy and incite-
ment, yet this distinction, if it exists at all, is primarily a function of the
listener, not the speaker." Moreover, it implicates intractable issues of cau-
sation. Second, even if the distinction between advocacy and incitement is
tenable, it is nonetheless a distinction between two types of speech. Merely
invoking it collapses the basic moral distinction between speech and action,
between saying something and doing it. The following Section elaborates
upon these observations.
3.1. Two Preliminary Caveats
Before proceeding to the argument, there are two issues that present
potential distractions but are not germane to my thesis that the First Amend-
ment protects all communication. First, the modem incitement approach to
the regulation of speech is based on specific intent. This means, generally,
that in order for speech to be punished, not only must the speech be likely
to incite or produce lawlessness, but the speech must be directed toward
inciting or. producing lawlessness. Further, it is also true that under the
modern approach, any alleged danger presented by certain speech must be
imminent, rather than merely possible (or even likely). Neither of these
qualifications, however, saves the clear and present danger test from the
defect discussed below. Despite the use of specific intent, and despite the
focus on "incitement," the modern.version of the test continues to blur the
morally and legally salient distinction between speech and action.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the moral criticism leveled
here against the clear and present danger doctrine does not flow in both
35 Courts attempt to objectify this distinction by asking, for example, whether certain
words would incite the reasonable listener. This gambit can succeed, but only at the
cost of silencing radical speech and, more importantly, by negating the moral distinction
between saying and doing.
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directions. Saying that speech is not an action does not imply that, for doc-
trinal purposes, action cannot be protected by the Free Speech Clause. Con-
sequently, the fact that it is wrong as a normative (and constitutional) matter
to treat words as conduct does not by any means cast doubt on the line of
cases that hold that certain conduct must be protected as speech.36 In Texas
v. Johnson,37 for example, the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute
that punished the desecration of the American flag, reasoning that the act of
burning a flag is protected as speech. The State argued a version of the
CPD test. The State maintained that although burning a flag may be speech,
it is speech that could deeply offend onlookers; therefore, the law against
flag desecration actually protected the public from potential breaches of the
peace. In rejecting the State's argument, the Court made a point sharp
enough to shred the entirety of the CPD test. The Court observed that even
though certain breaches of the peace may occur when an individual or group
burns a flag, the State has available the apparatus to punish those who in
fact breach the peace. The First Amendment protects speech. If people hear-
ing certain speech react lawlessly, the State has the power to punish the
people for their lawless actions rather than punish the speaker to whom they
are reacting.
The doctrinal strand of the First Amendment that treats certain conduct
as protected speech rests on the basic premise that speech is communication,
and certain conduct serves primarily, if not exclusively, as a means of com-
munication.38 This premise is manifestly correct; however, it has no bearing
on my thesis that speech-or, more generally, communication-is not action
and that the First Amendment protects communication (as distinguished
from action) absolutely.39
3.2. Saying and Doing
"Every idea is an incitement," wrote Holmes.4" There is nothing worth
saying that might not cause some listener to take action, action that may
36 The line of cases begins with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Commenting on this case, Professor Ely praised the Court for abandoning the speech-
conduct distinction. That may be a good idea when the speech or conduct is communi-
cative, but not so good when used to control speech (rather than merely conduct). See
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizing and Bal-
ancing First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975).
3' 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
38 Well-known examples of such communicative conduct include the gestures of sign
language and carrying a sign in a picket line.
" I should not be understood as challenging the power of the state to regulate
speech through reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.
40 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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well be unlawful. A listener who hears a Byron poem may become a radical
environmentalist, inspired to assassinate political leaders whom the listener
perceives as hostile to the environment, yet Holmes was not exactly correct.
Not every idea is an incitement, but every idea might be, and any idea can
be. Nevertheless, it is the act that the law must punish, rather than the os-
tensible trigger (or cause) of the act. This is true partly because we can
never be sure what actually is the trigger. The more powerful reason this is
true, however, is that saying that speech can be coupled with the bad act it
assertedly caused, and then punished exactly as is the act, is a conclusion
that is at war with the very core of the Free Speech Clause itself. The point
was succinctly made by Justice Douglas nearly a generation ago. Concurring
in Brandenburg, he wrote, "The line between what is permissible and not
subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regu-
lation is the line between ideas and overt acts."'"
The Free Speech Clause is unequivocal and absolute. What best ex-
plains this categorical rule-the words "no law"-is a normative intuition
held in our culture today and among the Framers centuries ago: Speech is
different from action. At the neurobiological level, there may well be no
difference between thinking something, saying something, and doing some-
thing, but within the ontology of American law, both civil and criminal, the
distinction is pivotal.43
4' Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 716-17 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
Court's holding that requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal
grand juries with respect to confidential sources does not abridge the freedom of
speech); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 262-75 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(positing that the First Amendment barred prosecution for being an active member of a
Communist organization).
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of
the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 110 (1982) (characterizing the Free
Speech Clause as "crisp and unambiguous"). But see Richard Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1986) (concluding that the lan-
guage of the Free Speech Clause is "indefinite and noncommittal").
43 See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
For a discussion of this point in the context of criminal law generally, see WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986); Richard C. Boldt,
The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245
(1992); Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound:
An Essay of Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995). For a discussion of the
idea in the context of tort law, see Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causa-
.tion and Responsibility, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 578 (1987). For a discussion of the
breakdown of this idea, see Craig C. Calhoun, Social Theory and the Law: Systems
Theory, Normative Justice, and Postmodernism, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 398, 449 (1989).
There is a sense in which theorists who argue for greater emphasis on communal re-
sponsibility for various phenomena are arguing against the theory of the First Amend-
743
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The language of the First Amendment sharply distinguishes between
saying and doing, and it consequently mandates that only overt acts are
punishable. In establishing this rule, the Free Speech Clause manages to
circumvent some of the most vexing problems in the philosophy of law.
Specifically, three factors generally must be present in order to justify pun-
ishing an individual. First, the individual must have acted. Second, the ac-
tion must have caused harm. Third, the individual must be culpable. Each of
these criteria presents well-known philosophical difficulties. I do not pro-
pose in this Essay to revisit the entire moral terrain presented by these is-
sues. Instead, I briefly will indicate why these issues are so complex and
then will show that by distinguishing sharply between saying and doing, the
genius of the First Amendment is that it resolves these complicated matters
when speech is at issue.
3.2.1. Action-Inaction
The first criterion implicates the problematic distinction between action
and inaction. When is not acting tantamount to acting? What does it even
mean to say that someone has "acted?" Charles Fried gave the example of
the pedestrian who saw a swimmer drowning, but declined to throw the
swimmer a nearby life preserver because it was freshly painted and the
pedestrian did not want to soil his clothes." Did the pedestrian act or re-
frain from acting? Bentham characterized inaction (or what he called omis-
sions) as "negative actions" on the ground that an individual who has de-
clined to act has nonetheless performed an act of will.45 Like Bentham,
George Fletcher argued that the appropriate focus is not on the difference
between actions and omissions, but on human agency.46 Certain failures to
act, Fletcher reminds us, are manifestly punishable: for example, failure to
pay one's taxes or to register for the draft.47 It is certainly true as an empir-
ical proposition that Anglo-American criminal law generally distinguishes
ment put forth in this Essay. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Bound-
aries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992); Jurgen Habermas, Morality and Ethi-
cal Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
38, 42 (1989).
44 See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 52 (1978). The related and relevant
question for Free Speech Clause jurisprudence is: When is nonspeech tantamount to
speech?
41 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 75-76 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Claredon Press 1996). Gilbert Ryle
has argued that Bentham errs in characterizing inaction as willful. See GILBERT RYLE,
THE CONCEPT OF MIND 62 (1949).
46 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1443 (1994).
47 See id. at 1447.
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between actions and omissions and tends to punish only the former.48 It is
also true, however, that this general rule is riddled with exceptions and that,
in any event, the distinction between an action and an omission is sustained
more by history than by logic. Is an action taken by a sleepwalker an "ac-
tion" for purposes of criminal law? The answer is no, but only because the
somnambulist, lacking mens rea, is deemed not to have acted49-demon-
strating yet again the vast incompleteness of the definition of action. Like-
wise, Hart and Honor6 suggest that someone who does not water a plant
thereby has "acted" and has caused the plant to die.5" George Fletcher, pur-
suing the example, posited a commercial pilot who refused to take the con-
trols and fly the plane:5 Has not he acted in such a way as to be subject to
homicide statutes (even though there is a potent linguistic sense in which his
crime really consists of "not acting")?
What is clear is that the distinction between acting and not acting may
be tenable as a proposition of physics, but as an indicator of moral and legal
culpability it is highly porous. The clear and present danger test, as current-
ly understood, therefore means that the difficulties presented by this issue
also are applicable in the context of speech. That is, insofar as inaction is, at
least on occasion, tantamount to action, would a refusal to persuade poten-
tial rioters not to riot be punishable? Judge Hand assumed that it was clear
beyond cavil that the Free Speech Clause does not prohibit the state from
punishing a speaker whose words instigated a riot;52 however, why should
a speaker who says "Let's start looting" be liable (whether as a criminal or
as a tortfeasor) while a speaker who declines to say "Let's not loot" be held
blameless? This is not an easy question in the context of existing First
Amendment doctrine.53 In contrast, under a theory of the Amendment's text
that holds, as I propose, that no speech is punishable, the question cannot
even arise.
48 See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF Ac-
TION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993).
"' See Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1828
(1994).
5o See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORI, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 38 (2d ed. 1985).
1 See Fletcher, supra note 46, at 1448.
32 See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d. Cir. 1950), af'd, 340 U.S.
863 (1950).
53 It also is not easy in view of the modern trend in many areas of law, from crimi-
nal law to tort law, to punish actors who fail or neglect to prevent harm. See, e.g.,
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 266-67 (1980)
(stating that a duty to rescue is an internal matter beyond the reach of the external con-
straints of positive law).
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3.2.2. Causation
The second factor that must be present to justify punishment is causa-
tion. Irrespective of the tenability of the distinction between action and
inaction, an individual is not morally blameworthy unless her action (or
inaction) has caused harm. 4 Causation is a notoriously complicated no-
tion.5 Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently argued that "no plausible analy-
sis of causality" has yet to be offered. 6 In an earlier book, Thomson grap-
pled with the issue by putting forward the notion of "event-ownership": that
is, "For a person z to cause an event E it is necessary both that there be an
event C that causes E, and that C be in some sense his."57 What Thomson
succeeds in doing with this definition, however, is simply to divert attention
from the physical matter of causation, which sometimes seems clear enough,
to the far more difficult normative matter of ownership. Consider, for exam-
ple, Thomson's trolley problem. 8 An out of control trolley is hurtling
down a track toward five men who will be killed if the trolley reaches them.
A passerby named Bloggs is standing next to a switch. If he turns it, the
trolley will veer off the main track onto a spur, but a single man is standing
on the spur, and he will be killed if Bloggs throws the switch. If Bloggs
does not act, will he have caused the deaths of the five men on the main
trolley? To be sure, there is certainly a sense in which he will have, but in
this case not acting would cause five deaths, while acting would cause but
one (while saving five).59 No matter what Bloggs chooses to do or not to
do, it will be possible, and indeed plausible, to say he has caused one or
more deaths.
Whether an individual can be said to own the event C that produces
objectional (or unlawful) event E apparently does not depend simply on the
distinction between acting and not acting. Accordingly, moral philosophers
have expended great energies stating the conditions under which an individ-
ual can be said to cause certain harm.6" Suppose, for example, that Bloggs
5 The law of attempts might be said to punish potential harm, and for this very
reason is it philosophically problematic. It is ordinarily justified, however, by a prag-
matic theory that holds that potentially harmful conduct ought to be punished even
when the actor fortuitously caused no injury, so as to deter others from engaging in
such risky activity.
" See HART & HONORI, supra note 50.
16 JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 234 (1990).
57 JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, AcTS AND OTHER EVENTS 149 (1977). The reason that
event C is required is that causal laws link events rather than persons (though that mat-
ter is not pursued here). See id.
5 THOMSON, supra note 56, at 176. Thomson actually borrows the problem from
Phillipa Foot. See PHILLIPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 21-32 (1978).
51 See THOMSON, supra note 56, at 176.
' A superb treatment of these issues is found in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DE-
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would throw the necessary switch if he were to know that the trolley was
approaching. If another person were to see the trolley coming but were to
say nothing to Bloggs, would that nonspeech have caused the deaths of the
five pedestrians?
In contrast to those like Thomson who have sought to develop an ade-
quate notion of moral causation, other philosophers, including Thomas
Nagel, have argued that the question of causation is morally irrelevant.
Nagel has argued that the question of whether a certain action caused exter-
nal harm is typically susceptible to "moral luck"- factors that the individu-
al cannot control.6" (It was beyond Bloggs's control, for instance, that he
happened to be where he was at the moment the trolley approached.) When
Holmes and Hand asked whether speech threatened imminent harm, they
were asking a question about causation, about the closeness of the nexus
between words and deeds--about whether a speaker "owns" a certain admit-
tedly harmful outcome. Law as a whole cannot avoid the morass of causa-
tion,62 but the theory of the First Amendment proposed here makes the is-
sue of causation entirely irrelevant. When all the actor has done is speak,
the issue of imminence will never arise.
For example, it is possible that when Tupac Shakur recorded the record
that Ronald Howard was listening to in the moments before Howard com-
mitted murder, Shakur himself might have been imagining murder. Shakur
might have imagined that people who heard his music would become mur-
derous. He might even have been advocating murder. Regardless of whether
he was imagining any of these things, however, he did not act; all he did
was communicate. If a murder follows a song, then even if we can bridge
the impossibly wide causation cavern and say that the song caused the mur-
der--even if we can say that Shakur's lyrics caused Howard to act-we still
will not have dissolved the distinction between singing and shooting. 3 By
SERVING (1970); see also John Casey, Actions and Consequences, in MORALITY AND
MORAL REASONING 155 (John Casey ed., 1971) (theorizing that moral principles not
justified by their results are inherently flawed); Elliot Sober, Apportioning Causal Re-
sponsibility, 85 J. PHIL. 308 (1988) (arguing that the relative contribution of a cause and
the difference it makes in the effect are separate issues).
61 See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MOR-
AL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20 (1981); Michael J. Zimmerman,
Luck and Moral Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374 (1987).
612 Some philosophers, however, certainly have argued that causation is irrelevant to
'the issue of blameworthiness. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, I Could Not Have Done
Otherwise-So What, 81 J. PHIL. 553, 553 (1984) ("1 assert that it simply does not
matter at all to moral responsibility whether the agent in question could have done
otherwise in the circumstances.").
6'3 For examples of civil suits arguing that music caused harm, see generally Waller
v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), affid without opinion, 958 F.2d 1084
(11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 916 (1992) (involving a suit for wrongful death
filed by the parents of a boy who committed suicide after repeatedly listening to the
747
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
presuming as a fixed axiom that speech is not action, the First Amendment
completely circumvents the complex issues of causation.' Ronald Howard
does not even get to try to establish that Tupac Shakur "caused" him to
murder Officer Bill Davidson because what Shakur did was speak. Shakur
communicated; Howard acted.
3.2.3. Responsibility
There is only one exception to the potent firewall that the First
Amendment erects between speech and action. That exception, which lies
within the third requirement for punishment, is satisfied when the speaker,
through his or her speech, overwhelms the individual listener's will.
The third factor that must be present for punishment to be justified
requires that the individual who acted and caused the harm be legally
blameworthy. To be sure, legal responsibility and moral responsibility do
not always walk hand in hand. The law may deem not legally responsible
someone who strikes us as, in fact, being morally responsible. Conversely,
the law may deem legally responsible an individual who seems morally
blameless.65 Nevertheless, what law and morality have in common is the
requirement of blameworthiness, even though the criteria for satisfying this
condition may not overlap in these two domains with perfect.precision. My
contention here is that when the speaker has, in fact, overborne the will of
the listener, then it is appropriate to say that the speaker has acted in a
culpable fashion.'
Whether a speaker has overwhelmed the will of a listener ordinarily will
be a matter of fact. Thus, for example, if a speaker says to a listener that he
will pay her a certain sum of money if she murders someone, then (apart
from the question of whether a promise of future payment is tantamount to
present action) the speaker might well succeed in overcoming the listener's
will. Whether the speaker succeeds will depend on a number of factors,
including the amount of money offered, the financial condition of the listen-
er, and so forth. If, however, we conclude that the speaker controlled the
listener's will to such a degree as to render the speaker liable for punish-
music of heavy metal singer Ozzy Osbourne); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr.
187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (with the same general premise). In each of these cases, the
trial and appellate courts correctly found that the First Amendment barred the plaintiffs'
claims because the defendants did not engage in culpable incitement of suicide.
6 As one commentator recently (and correctly) observed, "there is no proof that
emotions or sudden external provocations can truly overcome our ability to make moral
choices (e.g., not to kill someone)." Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individu-
al Responsibility and the Deconstruction of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1168
(1997).
65 See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 30.
66 See HART & HONORt, supra note 50, at 58, 143-44.
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ment, this means the listener's legal culpability will be accordingly dimin-
ished. To return to our case of Tupac Shakur, suppose that Shakur had
kidnapped Ronald Howard, hypnotized him, and during the hypnosis im-
planted the instruction that Howard do exactly what Shakur commanded.
Under such a scenario, Howard would be permitted to argue that the rap
lyrics he was listening to constituted a command from Shakur, that Howard
was incapable of ignoring.67 Under such circumstances, a jury might
choose to acquit Howard (or to punish him less severely). Under this scenar-
io, Howard is just a robot, an extension of Shakur; Shakur is the actor.
Shakur will be subject to punishment for his speech, but concommitantly
Howard will not be punished for his actions (or will be punished less se-
verely).
This illustration also demonstrates the symmetry between those cases in
which the speaker has conquered the listener's will and those cases in which
the listener is deemed insufficiently responsible for an act to merit punish-
ment. That is to say, in the actual case of Officer Davidson's murder, Ron-
ald Howard cannot escape punishment and Shakur cannot face punish-
ment,' unless it can be shown that Shakur's lyrics overwhelmed Howard's
will. If Shakur can face punishment, however, it means he has acted, and if
he has acted, then Howard has not. One can view this issue mathematically:
A certain quantum of moral blameworthiness attaches to every bad act. That
quantum can be divided among several actors, but it is not possible for the
entire quantum to be assigned to more than one actor.
A word should be added here concerning Robert Nozick's view of this
issue.69 Nozick defends a principle that prohibits the state from punishing
actions that are not wrong in themselves but that merely facilitate another's
wrongful actions. Yet he also seeks to show that this principle does not
insulate from punishment one who urges or seeks to persuade another to do
67 The operative fact here is that Howard must have been incapable of resisting
Shakur's command such that he could not help but follow it. Take as another example
the case of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd,
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). In Rice, the defendant published a book called Hit Man,
which essentially provided step-by-step instructions for planning and carrying out a
murder. When James Perry killed three Maryland residents by following the instructions
in Hit Man, the family members of the victims sued the defendant publisher for
wrongful death. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that the publication of Hit Man did not satisfy the Brandenburg test be-
cause it did not command the reader immediately to go out and commit murder. While
the court's holding strikes me as correct, the distinction that the court drew is somewhat
chimerical without recognizing the basic premise of this Essay. Whether a speaker has
advised or commanded a listener to commit a lawless act is irrelevant if the speaker did
not overwhelm the listener's will such that the speaker conflated his will with the
listener's.
68 By punishment, I certainly mean to include a finding of tort liability.
69 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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wrong. In arguing that one who persuades another to do wrong should be
punished, Nozick writes that it is wrong to think there is a "fixed amount of
responsibility" for a bad act.7" For example, Nozick suggests, if two people
cooperate in committing a murder, "[e]ach may receive the same punish-
ment as someone acting alone, n years say. They need not each be given
n/2."'" Nozick concludes that this proves that "[r]esponsibility is not a
bucket in which less remains when some is apportioned out."72
Nozick, however, has made three mistakes. First, he has confused the
legal matter of punishment with the altogether different concept of responsi-
bility. The fact that two actors may be eligible for the same punishment
does not demonstrate, or even imply, that their responsibility for a particular
act is the same. One may be responsible for pulling the trigger, the other for
driving the vehicle; one may be responsible for firing the gun, another for
purchasing the bullets. We simply cannot tell from the fact of similar pun-
ishment precisely what a given actor has been deemed responsible for. Sec-
ond, the state may punish, absent constitutional limitations, varying degrees
of responsibility with identical punishment. There is neither a legal nor a
moral constraint that compels the state to allocate punishment on the basis
of fine gradations of responsibility. Third and most important, the fact that
moral and legal responsibility for a given result will at times be shared
among more than one actor is not germane to my thesis, which holds simply
that when all an actor did was speak, the First Amendment dictates that this
person may not be included in the group of those to whom the state will
assign legal responsibility.
The view of blameworthiness that inheres in the Free Speech Clause is
classically Aristotelian. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claimed that
we can blame individuals for their actions that cause harm when two condi-
tions are satisfied: First, the action must indeed be bad, and second, the
action must have been voluntary (or, perhaps more precisely, not involun-
tary).73 By "action" Aristotle manifestly meant some physical act (as distin-
guished from speech). In addition, it is telling that the major focus of
Aristotle's effort was to make clear what is meant by voluntary (and to
explain how voluntariness is a crucial aspect of blameworthiness). In a
sense, Aristotle was addressing a version of the problem of free will,74 a
matter which has consumed theologians as well as moral philosophers for
70 Id. at 130.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 136-40 (Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobb-
Merrill Co. 1962). In reaching this conclusion, I also have relied heavily on Professor
Smiley's lucid treatment of the issues. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 37-57 (1992).
'4 Smiley has argued, however, that Aristotle was not "concerned primarily with free
will." SMILEY, supra note 73, at 39.
750 [Vol. 6:3
1998] THE MORAL FAILURE OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST 751
millennia." Aristotle's project reveals the same sensibility displayed in al-
most all discussions of free will: Unless the individual who did something
bad acted volitionally, then it is morally troublesome to punish her.
Aristotle defined a voluntary act as one in which the "initiative lies with
the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is
performed."'76 One could construct a hypothetical in which the act of speak-
ing failed to satisfy this definition of voluntariness. A defendant who has
confessed to a crime under duress or coercion has spoken involuntarily. A
hostage who on videotape expresses love for her captors while her captors
aim rifles at her head has spoken involuntarily. These examples, however,
are distractions. When an individual speaks in the public domain and in-
vokes the First Amendment to protect that speech, the speech presumptively
is voluntary. The fact that moral philosophy simply does not pay any atten-
tion to the possibility that speech might be involuntary (in the same way
that action might be involuntary) signals an important normative fact:
Speech is not action.77 If speech were action, it would be necessary to de-
termine whether conditions of voluntariness are satisfied when speech is the
first factor in a causal chain that terminates in some harm or injury. Instead,
Aristotle, and moral philosophers in general, take for granted that the act of
speaking is a voluntary matter.
Why, then, in philosophical discussions of blameworthiness (from Aris-
totle to the present) is it not a simple matter to punish a speaker whose
speech initiates a chain of events that culminated in harm? Insofar as the act
is voluntary, the issue of blameworthiness would be clear, but for one fact.
That fact-that normative, and constitutional, fact-is that the act of speak-
ing simpliciter is never regarded as sufficient to cause the kind of harm that
the law addresses. In addition to the speech (the communication), there must
be some further act. It is this further act that, assuming the actor is blame-
worthy, subjects someone to punishment.
That is why the Free Speech Clause dictates that the actor (rather than
the speaker) be punished. The state may never permissibly punish a speaker
as a culpable actor unless the speaker: (1) specifically intended to cause an
unlawful injury, (2) proximately caused that unlawful injury, and (3) exerted
" A fine treatment is DETERMINISM, FREE WILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Gerald Dworkin ed., 1970); see also HARRY G. FRANKFURT, What We Are Morally
Responsible For, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 95 (1988) (discuss-
ing whether free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility).
76 ARISTOTLE, supra note 73, at 57.
7 It merits emphasis at this point that while the claim in this Essay is that the law
anticipated by the Free Speech Clause can punish only action, a cogent moral theory
may punish speech with equal force. See, e.g., FRANKFURT, supra note 75, at 100 (de-
scribing speech and nonspeech as part of a person's "behavior" that subjects him to
moral judgment).
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a power over the listener so profound that the listener herself could not be
held morally accountable for her actions.
4.0. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the legal conclusion I trumpet here will not necessarily
coincide with our moral conclusions. An individual may escape legal liabili-
ty yet remain morally blameworthy for some set of events that results from
her speech," but this fact is pass6;"9 that there are distinctions between
the rule of law and morality does not have any impact on whether speech,
even morally opprobrious speech, is shielded by the clear and unambiguous
language of the First Amendment. In part this may be because of serious
reservations about the causation between word and deed, and in part it may
result from the legal status of the free speech guarantee. Whatever the etiol-
ogy, the First Amendment rests on the solid ethical foundation that distin-
guishes between word and deed.
The path from speech to action is always mediated by will. Faced with
even the most inspiring rhetoric, the listener has a will of her own. Whether
listening to the hateful rhetoric of another Hitler or admiring the radical
idealism of Thoreau, it is always the listener who chooses to act or not to
act. That decision, that exercise of will, is punishable. The rhetoric, the
poetry, never is. That is what the Free Speech Clause means.
78 See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 30.
" See David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of
Article V, 76 IowA L. REV. 1, 18 & n.76 (1990).
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